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Introduction
On 23 June 2016, the UK electorate voted to leave the European Union. This decision is likely to be the most important change in UK economic policy for a generation. Most studies conducted prior to the referendum concluded that the long-run e¤ect of a UK exit from the European Union ('Brexit') would be a reduction in British living standards (see for example, Dhingra et al. 2017 ; HM Treasury, 2016; OECD, 2016; NIESR, 2016). Because Brexit will not take place before March 2019, it is too early to evaluate the actual long-run impact on the UK economy.
However, an increasing number of studies have documented that the referendum has already had negative short-term consequences such as lower GDP growth and higher in ‡ation (see Born et al., 2017; Breinlich et al., 2017) .
In this paper, we add to the emerging literature on the short-run e¤ects of Brexit by studying stock market reactions to the referendum result and subsequent policy announcements that clari…ed the likely form Brexit would take -the speeches by the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, at the Conservative Party conference in October 2016 and at Lancaster House in January 2017.
Besides providing direct evidence on share prices and the associated changes in stock market capitalisation and wealth, we hope that stock price reactions will also be useful to gauge the future economic impact of Brexit. Share prices are, in essence, aggregates of all information available to market participants at any given point in time. They re ‡ect expectations about the future pro…tability of individual companies and sectors. Expected future changes in economic conditions such as changes in trade barriers post-Brexit will thus lead to immediate stock price reactions. Of course, market participants may be wrong, and share price movements might not correctly capture the e¤ects of such changes. But given the information aggregation function of stock markets, share price reactions capture the 'consensus view'of a large number of wellinformed economic actors such as banks, insurance companies and investment funds. They are thus a useful alternative to estimates based on the work of individual experts, which form the basis of existing forecasts. Indeed, this is the motivation behind a large body of stock market event studies that use share price reactions to speci…c policy or regulatory events to infer likely future e¤ects (see Binder, 1998 , for a survey).
For each of our three events, we estimate abnormal returns for up to 350 UK-listed …rms and regress these returns on indicators capturing exposure to the potential e¤ects of a future exit from the European Union. Besides standard variables such as …rm size and pro…tability, we use …rms'export and import status, their engagement in EU and UK markets, and whether they report in currencies other than sterling. We also look at sector-level variables such as likely future EU tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers, business cycle sensitivity, and the share of EU immigrants in the workforce of an industry.
We …nd that stock price changes on 24 June, the …rst trading day after the referendum, are best explained by variables capturing …rms'dependence on the UK market, business cycle sensitivity, and …rms' export status and reporting currency. We interpret these results as evidence that initial market reactions were driven by fears of an economic slowdown in the UK and by the consequences of the steep depreciation of sterling that followed the Leave vote. By contrast, prospective trade barriers do not have a signi…cant impact, suggesting that market participants either did not have su¢ cient knowledge about such barriers or considered their imposition unlikely or unimportant.
This pattern is partially reversed when we look at reactions to Theresa May's speeches at the Conservative Party conference on 5 October 2016 and at Lancaster House on 17 January 2017.
In our baseline speci…cation, the only variable that has a consistently signi…cant impact on 5
October 2016 are tari¤s. In particular, …rms in sectors with higher current EU import tari¤s saw lower abnormal returns. We believe this is consistent with the idea that May's speech, as well as other policy announcements during the Conservative Party conference, was the …rst o¢ cial con…rmation that the UK would be aiming for an exit from both the EU customs union and the single market (a so-called 'hard Brexit'). The Lancaster House speech con…rmed these intentions and provided additional detail, as well as clarifying that the UK was prepared to fall back on WTO trading terms in the event of a breakdown of negotiations with the EU.
Results are less clear-cut for this event, but we also …nd negative coe¢ cients on both tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers in our abnormal returns regressions. Compared to our results for the day after the referendum, however, these additional …ndings appear somewhat less robust and are sensitive to the length of the event window chosen. By contrast, the explanatory power of our proxies for recessionary expectations and sterling's depreciation retain explanatory power over longer event windows beyond 24 June 2016.
Our work contributes to a growing literature on the observed e¤ects of the Brexit vote on the UK economy. It is most closely related to three papers that also study stock market reactions to the referendum and subsequent events. Schiereck, Kiesel and Kolaric (2016) focus more narrowly on the …nancial sector, and show that stock prices of banks dropped sharply after the referendum, particularly for EU banks. Ramiah, Pham and Moosa (2016) look at a much wider range of sectors and discuss whether the observed price reactions are in line with prior expectations. They do not regress abnormal returns on explanatory variables, however, and thus cannot formally test hypotheses about di¤erential sector-level impacts advanced in the pre-referendum literature. Similar to our paper, Davies and Studnicka (2017) correlate abnormal returns with a number of explanatory variables, focusing on the role of global value chains. We study a wider range of determinants, however, and link our choice of explanatory variables more closely to forecasts made before the referendum. This makes our results more relevant for a comparison of expert forecasts with the expectations of market participants.
For example, we show that investors shared concerns regarding the potential for an economic downturn stressed by pre-referendum forecasts as well as (to a lesser extent) the importance of future trade barriers.
The present paper is also related to a small number of studies which look at stock price reactions to trade policy events. Perry (1986, 1989 ), Hughes, Lenway and Rayburn (1997), Bloningen, Tomlin and Wilson (2004) , and Crowley and Song (2014) look at stock price reactions to sector-speci…c anti-dumping duties. Grossman and Levinsohn (1989) use stock price reactions to test the speci…c factors model of international trade. Moser and Rose (2014) estimate the impact of regional trade agreements on aggregate stock market indices, and Brander (1991) , Thompson (1993) and Breinlich (2014) follow stock price movements sur-rounding the rati…cation process of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989. Our paper di¤ers from these studies in that we look at stock market reactions to an arguably much more signi…cant policy change that is expected to have strong e¤ects beyond its direct implications for trade policy. In contrast to the literature on free trade agreements, Brexit also presents an interesting policy experiment in that it is expected to increase, rather than lower, future trade barriers.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the mechanisms through which Brexit may a¤ect stock prices. Section 3 discusses the stock market event study methodology we use. Section 4 describes the speci…c events as well as our explanatory variables and data sources in more detail. Section 5 presents results for our abnormal returns regressions and carries out a number of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Economic Mechanisms
The stock market response to the Brexit referendum 'shock'is expected to be greater for …rms that are more exposed to the shock and its consequences. The shock has several di¤erent dimensions. First, the referendum result led to an immediate depreciation of sterling. On 24 June 2016 the pound depreciated by 8.1% against the US dollar and 5.8% against the euro.
Second, leaving the EU could lead to major changes in future trade and migration policy. Third, the Leave vote increased uncertainty about UK economic policy and may have caused investors to downgrade their expectations for future UK growth in both the short-run and over longer horizons.
The impact of the depreciation of sterling depends on …rms'participation in international markets. Multinational …rms that earn revenue in currencies other than sterling will experience a direct increase in their sterling-denominated earnings following the depreciation. This is likely to raise their market value, since we study stock prices quoted in sterling. The depreciation may also boost exporters' pro…ts in foreign markets through increased competitiveness and higher markups, while negatively a¤ecting importers by increasing the cost of foreign goods.
Once the UK leaves the EU, it may no longer be a member of the EU's single market or customs union. Instead, it might sign a free trade agreement with the EU or it could trade with the EU under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Trading on WTO terms would lead to higher tari¤s between the UK and the EU. Brexit is also likely to increase border non-tari¤ barriers such as customs procedures and rules of origin requirements. These barriers would be particularly costly for …rms with complex international supply chains. To the extent that there is regulatory divergence between the UK and the EU after Brexit, exporters will also face additional costs of complying with EU product standards. Overall, exposure to future changes in UK-EU trade barriers is higher for …rms that participate in international trade through either exporting or importing, for multinational …rms with a¢ liates in EU countries and for …rms in sectors where the EU currently has high tari¤ or non-tari¤ barriers on trade with WTO members.
Since high levels of EU immigration were arguably an important driver of the Leave vote, it is possible that the UK will impose tighter restrictions on EU immigration after Brexit.
Consequently, …rms employing a high share of EU immigrants may be more a¤ected by the Leave vote, as they could su¤er from a reduction in labor supply.
Before the referendum a majority of forecasters predicted a slowdown in economic growth or even a recession in the event of a Leave victory. Thus, …rms in sectors that are less 'recessionproof'may be expected to su¤er more in the aftermath of the referendum. Since the likelihood of a slowdown or a recession depends on investors'expectations about the form Brexit will take, the impact of policy announcements such as Theresa May's speeches at the Conservative Party conference and at Lancaster House could also depend on …rms'business cycle sensitivities.
Finally, exposure to Brexit may also be related to …rm characteristics such as performance and size. Larger and more pro…table …rms might be more resilient and better able to withstand any negative e¤ects of Brexit. However, such …rms are also likely to be more engaged in the international economy through trade or foreign investment. Consequently, the overall correlation of these characteristics with exposure to Brexit is ambiguous.
The next two sections describe how we test the importance of these mechanisms in explaining stock price responses to the Brexit vote. We …rst explain the methodology used for estimating abnormal stock returns and then discuss the variables employed to capture the di¤erent channels outlined above.
Methodology
We follow a two-step procedure to estimate the impact of a number of Brexit-related variables on the abnormal returns of UK-listed …rms. First, we estimate a model of 'normal'stock returns which adjusts for di¤erences in risk and other characteristics of stocks. A standard approach in the literature is to use the so-called market model which relates the return r it on stock i at time t to a stock-speci…c constant i and the return on the market portfolio, R mt (Campbell et al., 1989; Binder, 1998) :
where e it is the mean-zero random component of the return-generating process and T 1 is the socalled pre-event window of stock price data on which (1) is estimated. This method controls for di¤erences in average returns across stocks ( i ), a stock's (non-diversi…able) risk as measured by i and movements in the market portfolio. On event dates, stock returns also have an 'abnormal' component ( it ) which in the present context could be caused by the arrival of unexpected news about Brexit and its e¤ects on the UK economy. Thus, on event dates stock returns are given by:
where T 2 denotes the event window (for example, 24 June 2016 for our referendum event).
Having obtained estimates of i and i using stock price data from the pre-event window only, we compute abnormal returns estimates (^ it ) as a prediction error for the event window:
where the predicted values,r it =^ i +^ i R mt , have been constructed using the pre-event window estimates of i and i and the return on the market portfolio on the event day.
The second step is to model abnormal returns as a function of variables that explain variation in abnormal returns across …rms and sectors.
where it denotes the true abnormal return of …rm i on event date t, is the regression constant, X i is a N k 1 vector of k 1 …rm-level regressors and Z j is an N k 2 vector of k 2 sector-level regressors where j denotes …rm i's industry. (N denotes the number of stocks included in the regression.) We are interested in the signs and magnitudes of two coe¢ cient vectors, and , which describe the correlation between our regressors and …rm-level abnormal returns. 1 An important issue for inference in event studies is the correct computation of standard errors for the coe¢ cient estimates of interest ( and ). To get a clearer understanding of the issues at stake, note from (2) and (3) that the relationship between the true abnormal return ( it ) and the estimated abnormal return (^ it ) is given by:
Furthermore, recall that we have assumed that abnormal returns are a function of observables and a mean-zero random component ( ) as given by (4) . Combining this expression with (5) allows us to state our basic estimating equation as
where " it = it + it . This expression shows that heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence of the residuals in regressions using estimated abnormal returns as the dependent variable can arise from a number of sources. First, there could be heteroskedasticity and/or cross-sectional dependence in the random component of the abnormal returns themselves ( it ).
Second, heteroskedasticity and/or cross-sectional dependence in the random component of the return-generating process (e it ) could be present. Finally, the forecasting error, ( i ^ i ) + i ^ i R mt , might introduce both heteroskedasticity and dependence; this source of error will become smaller as the length of the event period increases, however. Kara…ath (1994) and Harrington and Shrider (2007) carry out Monte Carlo simulations 1 In principle, one could also directly use overall returns (rit) as the dependent variable in the second-stage regression. We follow the standard practice in the event-study literature of using abnormal returns because we want to examine the part of a stock's return that is driven by the event in question, rather than other return patterns speci…c to the stock or its correlation with the market portfolio. If such stock-speci…c return patterns are correlated with our second-stage regressors, then using overall returns would bias our coe¢ cient estimates. In practice, overall and abnormal returns are highly correlated (in excess of 95% on all three event dates) and, in our robustness checks below, we show that none of our qualitative …ndings is changed when using overall returns as the dependent variable.
under di¤erent assumptions about the error terms e it and it and …nd that simple OLS with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors performs well compared to other methods such as Feasible GLS. To account for possible cross-sectional dependence in " it , we will also cluster standard errors by industry throughout this paper. 2 
Events and Data Sources
This section provides further information about the three events we will study, the choice of explanatory variables for our abnormal returns regressions and our data sources.
Description of Events
We analyse stock market reactions to three events. The …rst is the referendum on EU membership itself. While the referendum took place on 23 June 2016, the outcome was not known until the early hours of the next day and we use 24 June 2016 (a Friday) as our …rst event date. The referendum result took market participants by surprise. Opinion polls had predicted a close vote but betting markets implied a probability of around 85% that the UK would choose to remain in the EU (The Economist, 2016), re ‡ecting the conventional wisdom that undecided voters would opt for the status quo. Once it became clear that the UK had voted to leave, the pound depreciated sharply against all major currencies and share prices dropped when markets reopened on 24 June. 3 Our second and third events centre on two speeches by Theresa May outlining the likely form Brexit would take. While the referendum determined that the UK would leave the EU, it 2 See Cameron and Miller (2015) for further details as well as the relevant formula. In our data, …rms are classi…ed by our main data provider Bureau van Dijk into one of 150 NACE 4-digit industries. However, the number of industries actually included varies across regression samples and lies between 60 and 140. See below for details. 3 The FTSE All Shares declined by 3.8% on 24 June 2016. In our robustness checks, we will look at longer event windows to capture potential anticipation e¤ects or delayed e¤ects of the referendum.
While both speeches represented a shift towards a 'hard Brexit', it is less clear to what extent they led to signi…cant changes in market participants'expectations. In both cases, at least some of the information contained in the speeches had been made available to the public beforehand.
Nevertheless, at least the Conservative Party conference speech seems to have caught investors unprepared (Financial Times, 2016) and it led to a further 4.3% depreciation of sterling against the US dollar in the week following 5 October. By contrast, there seems to have been a more concerted e¤ort to prepare markets for the Lancaster House speech as information about some of its key points had been released a couple of days earlier. Sterling in fact rose by about 1.4% during the speech, presumably since investors valued greater certainty about the government's plans for Brexit (Financial Times, 2017) . In order to capture potential anticipation e¤ects, we will use longer event windows (t-1 to t+1 and t-3 to t+3) for both the Conservative Party conference and the Lancaster House speeches as part of our robustness checks.
Variables, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
For the computation of abnormal returns, we require information on stock prices and market portfolio returns. Stock price information is taken from Datastream and information about market portfolio returns is obtained from the websites of the London Stock Exchange and the website investing.com. All returns in the paper are measured as percentage changes, implying that abnormal returns are measured in percentage changes as well. We use the FTSE All Share index as our market portfolio proxy in most speci…cations. However, we will also check the sensitivity of our results to using other proxies such as the MSCI Europe as well as to controlling for multiple market indices representing Asia, Europe and the US.
Regarding our regressors, we consider various sets of …rm-and sector-speci…c variables (X i and Z j in equation 6) as outlined below. These regressors are related to the economic mechanisms discussed in Section 2.
First, we use a …rm's return on assets (ROA) and the value of its annual sales (in logs) as measures of pro…tability and size, respectively. We obtain data for both variables for the year before the referendum from Bureau van Dijk's Orbis database. The expected signs of these two regressors are a priori unclear. As explained in Section 2, on the one hand more pro…table and larger …rms might be better able to withstand negative shocks. But on the other hand, they might be more vulnerable as they tend to be more exposed internationally.
Second, we follow Davies and Studnicka (2017) in using information from Orbis on the share of a …rm's subsidiaries in the UK and the rest of the EU, as well as the total count of subsidiaries. 4 Davies and Studnicka interpret the share variables as measuring the exposure of a …rm's global value chain (GVC) to future trade barriers brought about by Brexit. The count of subsidiaries is used as a proxy for the complexity of a …rm's GVC, with more complex GVCs making a …rm more vulnerable to the e¤ects of leaving the EU. An alternative interpretation of the share of UK a¢ liates, however, is as a measure of exposure to the domestic UK market.
In the light of Davies' and Studnicka's results, we expect all three variables to be negatively correlated with abnormal returns.
Third, we use information on a …rm's export and import status from Dun & Bradstreet to construct three dummy variables for whether a …rm is an exporter, an importer or an exporterimporter. 5 While these indicators do not convey any information about the intensity with which …rms trade, they are the best available proxies for …rms' involvement in international trade. Given the steep depreciation of sterling on 24 June 2016, we would expect exporters to bene…t from gaining competitiveness in foreign markets and importers to be negatively a¤ected by the higher cost of foreign goods. Exchange rate e¤ects were smaller and less immediate for the other two events, with the Lancaster House speech actually leading to a slight appreciation of the pound. Hence, the expected sign and signi…cance patterns of the trade status dummies are less clear for these events.
Fourth, our …nal …rm-level indicator is a dummy variable for whether a …rm reports earnings in a currency other than sterling, again obtained from Orbis. This variable serves as a proxy for whether a …rm earns a substantial amount of its pro…ts in foreign currencies. If the pound depreciates, earnings measured in pounds will increase which will tend to push up the …rm's FTSE All-Shares stock price (which is quoted in pounds). 6 We also include four sector-level regressors. First, we compute the share of EU migrants in the workforce of an industry, using data from the UK Labour Force Survey published by the O¢ ce for National Statistics. 7 As explained in Section 2, given that high levels of EU immigration were arguably a key driver of the Leave vote, it is likely that the UK will see tighter restrictions on EU immigration after Brexit. Hence, we may expect sectors with a higher share of EU migrants to see stronger negative abnormal returns. This should be true for the reaction to the referendum result itself, as well as for the two speeches which explicitly mentioned future restrictions on EU immigration.
Second, we include a dummy variable for industries that tend to outperform the market in recessions. We use the classi…cation by Emsbo-Mattingly et al. (2017) who classify consumer staples, healthcare, telecommunication and utilities as 'recession outperformers'. 8 Since a majority of forecasters predicted a growth slowdown or even a recession in the event of a Leave victory, we expect 'recession-proof' stocks to do better on 24 June 2016. 9 By October 2016, however, it had become clear that the referendum result had not led to an immediate economic slowdown. For example, the UK was still the fastest growing economy in the G7 at the end of 2016 (OECD, 2018). Growth eventually slowed during 2017 (Born et al., 2017) , but this was 5 Dun & Bradstreet provide information on whether the company is an exporter ("Yes or No") or importer ("Yes or No") and we create a dummy variable for export and import status of the company using this information. If a company is reported both as an exporter and importer, we classify that company as an exporter-importer. D&B's sources include annual reports, Company House reports, industry reports and a network of 5,000 employees who check the accuracy of the data. 6 We do not directly observe the geographic split of …rm-level pro…ts in our data. However, for a sub-sample of …rms we have information on the distribution of sales based on subsidiary data. This information shows that …rms reporting in a foreign currency do indeed earn a smaller share of revenues in pounds than …rms reporting in GBP, and that this share is also small in absolute terms (on average only 25% of revenues come from inside the UK for …rms reporting in a foreign currency). 7 As is standard in the migration literature that uses this dataset, we focus on the country of birth of workers rather than their citizenship to de…ne the share of EU migrants. 8 See exhibits 6 and 7 in Emsbo-Mattingly et al. (2017) . 9 In the month immediately after the referendum, there was indeed a sharp deterioration of indicators of business con…dence. For example, IHS Markit's Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) dropped from 52 in June to 47 in July 2016, a decrease of a magnitude last seen at the onset of the …nancial crisis in 2008. not yet evident at the time of the Lancaster House speech. Thus, we do not expect a signi…cant correlation between the recession-proof dummy and abnormal returns for our last two events.
Finally, we include two measures of …rms' exposure to future trade barriers between the UK and the EU. For goods-producing industries, we use the EU's most-favoured nation (MFN) tari¤s, which are charged on imports from countries that do not have a preferential trade agreement with the EU. 10 While the Lancaster House speech stressed that the UK would be seeking EU market access through a comprehensive free trade agreement, it also did not rule out the UK leaving the EU without an exit deal. In that case, the UK would have to fall back on trade governed by WTO rules. This would imply facing EU MFN tari¤s as well as, in all likelihood, imposing such tari¤s on imports from the EU. For services trade, future trade restrictions are harder to predict and would take the form of non-tari¤ barriers (NTBs). If the UK were to leave the single market, as implied by May's Conservative Party conference speech and explicitly stated in her Lancaster House speech, it would lose preferential access to EU services markets. Moreover, rules and regulations would likely diverge from the EU over time, leading to further increases in NTBs. Hence, we use the service trade restrictiveness index (STRI) developed by the World Bank to measure EU member countries'policies as applicable to non-EU providers. 11 For both tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers, we use two types of procedures to map trade barriers to …rms. First, we calculate an average across all the industries a …rm is reported to be active in; second, we use a narrower measure that only uses tari¤s and NTBs for a …rm's core industry as reported in Orbis. We use the wider measure in our baseline speci…cation because it yields a signi…cantly higher number of observations. The narrower measure is included as part of our robustness checks.
We start with data for all 636 companies in the FTSE All Shares at the time of our data download (October 2017). We use the FTSE All Shares because it provides a broad-based sample including …rms with substantial international activities as well as more domestically focused companies. We drop eight companies that only report data for the …nancial year 2016 and with a closing date after the referendum. 12 We discard a further 26 …rms that do not report …nancial information at all in Orbis. For the estimation of the market model parameters in (1) we require one year of pre-event stock price data, which leads us to drop another 26 companies with short stock price time series. A substantial share (32%) of the remaining companies are investment trusts. 13 We exclude them from our baseline regressions because, in principle, they can invest anywhere in the world and it is unclear what e¤ect Brexit would have on them.
There is of course also a problem of double-counting for cases where investment trusts invest 1 0 We use ad-valorem equivalent tari¤ rates for 2015, which is the most recent year available in the World Bank's WITS database (our data source). 1 1 Data are for the year 2008, the only year available in the STRI. The STRI tries to measure the e¤ect of EU regulations that discriminate against foreign services or service providers. 1 2 We only use …nancial information for the year before the referendum because the Leave vote itself may have directly a¤ected …rms'…nancial outcomes. 1 3 Investment trusts are collective investments where investors' money is pooled together from the sale of a …xed number of shares which a trust issues when it launches. This money is then invested in a similar fashion to open-ended investment funds and in a variety of assets, such as listed equities, government and corporate bonds or real estate from any region in the world. in other companies listed on the FTSE All Shares index. 14 Finally, missing values for some of the regressors used in our analysis reduce the sample further, leaving us with around 350 stocks for our baseline regression. In addition to this baseline sample, we also consider a subsample of …rms in goods-producing industries (for which we observe EU MFN tari¤s) and a subsample of service-producing …rms for which we have data on EU NTBs as measured by the STRI. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables just discussed. Tables   2-4 show raw and abnormal returns on our three main event dates for the companies with the ten highest and ten lowest raw returns. On 24 June 2016, companies from the construction and related sectors accounted for 6 out of the 10 worst-performing stocks while precious metal producers and other mining companies dominate among the 10 best performers. This provides some …rst evidence that investors seem to have dumped business cycle sensitive shares on 24
June 2016 in favour of 'safe-haven'stocks such as gold producers like Acacia Mining or Randgold
Resources. By contrast, no clear pattern is evident on the other two event dates. Finally, note that both average returns and abnormal returns were strongly negative on the day after the referendum but not on 5 October 2016 nor on 17 January 2017. This is consistent with our prior that the two later events led to less signi…cant changes in market participants'expectations. Table 5 shows our baseline results. Columns 1 to 3 look at abnormal returns on 24 June 2016, the …rst trading day following the referendum, and columns 4-9 examine abnormal return patterns on our other two event dates.
Results

Baseline Results
In column 1, we exclude our two trade barrier measures, allowing us to use the largest possible sample (352 stocks). As seen, most but not all coe¢ cient signs con…rm our prior expectations. Firms reporting in currencies other than sterling experienced additional positive abnormal returns of around 3.6 percentage points. By contrast, increasing the share of subsidiaries in the UK or the EU by 10 percentage points reduces abnormal returns by 0.9 percentage points and 0.4 percentage points, respectively. Contrary to the results reported in Davies and Studnicka (2017) , however, the latter e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. 15 Our recession-proof dummy is also positive and signi…cant as expected, indicating that stocks in industries which perform better during downturns experienced abnormal returns that were 3.6 percentage points higher. Finally, the trade status indicators broadly conform to our priors; export status is associated with higher and import status with lower abnormal returns, and exporter-importers saw abnormal returns of an additional 2.24 percentage points. With the exception of import status, all trade indicators are statistically signi…cant at the 5% level.
The remaining regressors are all statistically insigni…cant. Contrary to Davies and Studnicka, we do not …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of the total number of subsidiaries. 16 Our proxies for size and pro…tability (ROA and log sales) are also insigni…cant, as is the share of EU migrants in an industry. 17 Overall, abnormal return patterns on 24 June 2016 are mainly driven by the exchange rate devaluation and the fear of a possible economic slowdown or recession. The signs and signi…cance patterns of the non-UK currency dummy and the trade status indicators are consistent with the expected impact of the sharp depreciation of the pound. The fact that stocks in 'recessionproof'industries did signi…cantly better and that …rms with more a¢ liates in the UK, and hence more exposure to the domestic market, did worse points to the additional role of recessionary expectations. Both sets of independent variables together explain around 34% of the total variation in abnormal returns on 24 June 2016. Adding the remaining regressors from Table 5 only increases this slightly to 37%. 18 What role did expectations of higher trade barriers play in explaining abnormal return patterns? The results in columns 2 and 3, where we include tari¤ barriers for goods-producing industries and non-tari¤ barriers for selected service industries, respectively, suggest that such expectations did not matter as both trade barrier proxies are insigni…cant. We caution that sample sizes are of course considerably smaller in both regressions, explaining why some of the other indicators also become statistically insigni…cant. Interestingly, the share of a¢ liates in the EU becomes signi…cantly negative in the goods-producing subsample regression (column 2), possibly suggesting that dependence on EU supply chains is more important for manufacturing …rms. The only indicators that are consistently statistically signi…cant across all three samples (columns 1-3) are the indicators we associate with expectations of a future recession (i.e., the recession-proof dummy and the share of a¢ liates in the UK).
Columns 4-6 and columns 7-9 in Table 5 examine abnormal return patterns on our other two event dates. As seen, the number of signi…cant variables and the overall explanatory power of the regressors drop signi…cantly, in line with our prior that these events only led to relatively minor changes in investor expectations. A number of interesting results emerge nevertheless.
First, the MFN tari¤ variable becomes signi…cantly negative on 5 October 2016, consistent with Theresa May's Conservative party conference speech signalling the intent to pursue a hard Brexit. 19 In terms of magnitudes, the coe¢ cient estimate suggests that a one percentage point increase in future MFN tari¤s is associated with 0.045 percentage points lower abnormal returns. Given that the average MFN tari¤ in our sample is 4.5 per cent, our results suggest that the expectation of higher tari¤s was associated with negative abnormal returns of around 1 6 Again, this seems to be due to the inclusion of additional control variables in our regressions. When we drop the recession-proof and trade status dummies, the coe¢ cient on the number of a¢ liates decreases to 0:0052 and becomes statistically signi…cant at the 5% level. 1 7 Looking across columns in Table 5 , the impact of higher ROA is always negative but only statistically signi…cant on two occasions. The coe¢ cients on log(sales) and the EU immigrant share are less stable and sometimes switch signs. 1 8 Using only the two recession proxies still yields an R 2 of 26% and only using the exchange rate proxies an R 2 of 20%. By contrast, all the other regressors together only explain around 7% of the variation in abnormal returns. 1 9 Inclusion of the MFN tari¤ variable also raises the explanatory power of the regression substantially from an R 2 of 7.5% to an R 2 of 13%. In terms of R 2 increases, it is the best explanatory variable for the goods-producing subsample on 5 October 2016. 0.2 percentage points in the average industry. However, this average hides signi…cant variation across sectors. For example, the MFN tari¤ at the 90th percentile of the distribution of tari¤s across sectors is 15 per cent and the maximum tari¤ (for the dairies and cheese making industry) is 57 per cent, corresponding to abnormal return changes of 0.7 and 2.6 percentage points, respectively. 20 Second, MFN tari¤s are also associated with more negative abnormal returns on 17 January 2017, the day of Theresa May's Lancaster House speech, although the e¤ect is smaller than in October and statistically insigni…cant. By contrast, the STRI variable proxying for non-tari¤ barriers in the service sector is now negative and statistically signi…cant for the …rst time.
A …nal pattern that emerges on 17 January is that the two recession proxies (the recessionproof dummy and the share of a¢ liates in the UK) now have the opposite signs to the postreferendum day, although coe¢ cient magnitudes are much smaller in absolute terms. It is not entirely clear how to interpret this result but it would be consistent with the generally positive market reactions to the Lancaster House speech mentioned above.
To conclude, the abnormal return patterns on 24 June are best interpreted as capturing the e¤ects of the steep depreciation of sterling and fears of an imminent growth slowdown or recession. By contrast, future trade barriers and immigration shares across industries played no role in explaining abnormal returns. There is, however, some tentative evidence that share price reactions on 5 October and 17 January were at least in part due to expectations of higher future tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers. 21 
Robustness Checks
Tables 6-12 present a number of robustness checks. We focus on what we consider the most important checks here and report additional results in a separate online appendix. 22 Table 6 uses two alternative measures for the importance of UK and EU a¢ liates, focusing on the full sample of …rms. Columns 1-3 use share data from Orbis based on the sales rather than the count of a¢ liates in the UK and the EU. Columns 4-6 use segment data from the annual accounts of parent companies which report the geographic breakdown of overall sales 2 0 It is standard practice in the trade literature to break down overall tari¤ changes into import tari¤s (payable by EU exporters to the UK), export tari¤s (payable by UK exporters to the EU) and intermediate input tari¤s (i.e., import tari¤s leading to increases in the cost of domestic producers importing foreign intermediate inputs). Unfortunately, this decomposition is not feasible here. First, the most likely scenario is that the EU and the UK will impose the same MFN tari¤s on each other in a WTO scenario. Second, we tried computing intermediate input tari¤s using the UK's input-output matrix but given the level of aggregation available in UK IO tables, the resulting tari¤ was highly correlated with the MFN tari¤ (correlation coe¢ cient of around 0.8). One case where the exclusion of intermediate input tari¤s is clearly problematic is the sugar producer Tate & Lyle who mainly use cane sugar and would bene…t from a possible lowering of UK import tari¤s after Brexit. Indeed, dropping Tate & Lyle from our sample increases the MFN tari¤ coe¢ cient to 0.05. 2 1 Note that, throughout, we are assuming that no …rm-speci…c information is revealed on event dates that is systematically correlated with our regressors of interest. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed enough data on …rm announcements to explicitly control for such potentially confounding factors. 2 2 These additional robustness checks are: i) including investment trusts in our regression sample; ii) applying a narrower de…nition of our trade barrier measures by using only data for a …rm's core industry rather than an average barrier across all industries a …rm is active in; iii) including dummy variables for broad NACE 1-digit industry groups (Agriculture and Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction, Finance and Insurance, and Other Services); iv) using a di¤erent market portfolio proxy for the computation of abnormal returns (the MSCI Europe instead of the FTSE All Shares); and v) using a six-month instead of a one-year estimation period for the computation of abnormal returns.
(also obtained from Orbis). Both variables are likely to be better proxies for the importance of the domestic and the EU market for UK-listed …rms than share measures based on simple counts of a¢ liates. However, this comes at the cost of a substantial decrease in sample size. 23 The results are qualitatively similar to Table 5 although the proxies for the sterling depreciation are less signi…cant. 24 In Tables 7 and 8 , we examine the sensitivity of our results to di¤erent speci…cations of our …rst-stage market model estimation equation (1) . In Table 7 , we include three market indices in addition to the FTSE All Shares: the S&P500, the MSCI Asia and the MSCI Europe. Ramiah et al. (2013) argue that this is necessary to control for the e¤ects of asynchronicity, stock market integration and spillover e¤ects in event studies. In Table 8 , we allow for the possibility that our events led to persistent changes in systematic risk. Following Ramiah et al. (2013) and Breinlich (2014), we do so by interacting the market model equation's stock-speci…c intercepts and correlations with the market portfolio with dummy variables taking the value one after each of the events. 25 Both modi…cations yield results that are very similar to our baseline estimates, consistent with the notion that for short event windows such as ours, the exact model used for the computation of abnormal returns is of lesser importance (see Andrade et al., 2001 ). 26 In Table 9 , we use overall instead of abnormal returns as the dependent variable in our regressions (i.e., r it in the notation of Section 3). As we explained in Section 3, abnormal returns are our preferred dependent variable because they control for stock-speci…c return patterns that are unrelated to the event in question and might be correlated with our second-stage regressors.
This said, returns on the market portfolio are likely to have been driven by the events in question to some extent, especially for our referendum event, so that we might not want to eliminate this part of overall returns. In practice, however, abnormal and overall returns are highly correlated in our sample. The correlation coe¢ cient between the two returns is 97% on 24 June 2016, 99% on 5 October 2016 and 95% on 17 January. Not surprisingly then, the results presented in Table 9 are very similar to our baseline results.
Tables 10-12 explore the e¤ect of varying the length of our event windows. In Table 10, we add the trading day before and after the event in question and use cumulative abnormal returns over these three-day windows as our dependent variable. This does not signi…cantly a¤ect coe¢ cient patterns for the referendum event (now 23-27 June 2016 as no trading took place on the 25th and 26th). Signi…cance levels are reduced for the other two events although 2 3 See the Appendix for details on how we compute these two alternative measures. 2 4 We do not report results for the goods-producing and services subsamples because the number of observations drops to as few as 50. Coe¢ cient estimates on the MFN tari¤ and STRI variables are almost identical to before, although signi…cance levels drop. Depending on the speci…cation, both remain signi…cant at the 10 per cent level, however. 2 5 That is, we now replace equation (1) with rit = i + i Rmt + P v dpost;v ( i + i Rmt) + eit, where v denotes our three events and dpost;v = 1 for dates on or after event v. Note that in order to be able to estimate this new equation, we need to extend our original estimation period to include and go beyond our event dates. In practice, we use data up to 31 May 2017. 2 6 Note that allowing for persistent changes in systematic risk by augmenting the market model equation with additional interaction terms is not suitable for controlling for more short-term changes in risk premia. To see this, note that in the extreme, one might want to allow for event day-speci…c changes in market model parameters which would mean …tting observed returns perfectly, with no abnormal returns left to explain. Thus, we caution that our results might at least in part pick up short-term changes in …rm-speci…c risk perceptions in addition to changes in the future pro…tability of individual companies. the coe¢ cient on the MFN tari¤ variable is around 50% larger than before. Table 11 uses time windows that are more speci…c to the events in question. As discussed, the Leave vote came as a clear surprise to market participants so that using a longer pre-event window does not seem appropriate. Instead, we extend our window to include an additional trading week after the event, so the window now runs from 23 June to 1 July. By this time, both the FTSE100 and the FTSE All Shares indices had regained their initial losses, so it is of interest to see whether our coe¢ cient pattern remains the same over this longer event horizon.
For our two other events, it seems likely that at least some of the relevant information reached market participants before the actual speeches, so we extend our event window to include the entire trading week surrounding the event. This is su¢ cient to include other speeches at the Conservative Party conference as well as interviews given to prepare market participants ahead of the Lancaster House speech. 27 For the referendum event, results for the longer event window are qualitatively similar to before. Our proxies for recession expectations remain highly statistically signi…cant and coe¢ cient estimates are larger in magnitude than for our baseline results. The same is true for the dummy variable indicating whether …rms report in a currency other than pounds, although the e¤ect for the goods-producing subsample is not statistically signi…cant. Coe¢ cient signs for for the trade status indicators are similar to before but statistical signi…cance is again lower.
Turning to the other two event windows, results are less consistent with previous estimates.
The signs on the two trade barrier variables are still negative for the Conservative Party conference speech event but no longer statistically signi…cant; by contrast, the MFN tari¤ variable is positive (although insigni…cant) for the Lancaster House speech. 28 This is surprising given that information about the likely form of Brexit had leaked in the days prior to the two speeches and casts doubt on whether market participants really based stock price valuations on likely future trade barriers. By contrast, one of our recession proxies (the share of subsidiaries in the UK) is now signi…cantly negative across two out of three samples for our second event (5 October).
These results indicate that the correlation between prospective trade barriers and abnormal returns found earlier seems somewhat fragile and depends on the exact speci…cation of the relevant event windows. By contrast, the results related to sterling's depreciation and investors' expectations of a slowdown or recession are robust to short extensions of our event window. As a …nal robustness check, we extend the event window for the referendum event yet further, to 20 and 60 trading days after 24 June 2016, respectively. This allows us to check how long-lasting the impact of the referendum on abnormal return patterns was. We note that these results need to be interpreted with more caution than those for our shorter event windows. This is because new stock-speci…c information that is unrelated to the Brexit referendum will become available in the weeks and months after the event, making the interpretation of cumulative abnormal return patterns more di¢ cult. That is, the longer the horizon, the harder it is to argue that abnormal returns are caused only (or at least mainly) by the event in question.
In addition, speci…cation choices for the abnormal returns estimation equation (e.g., whether
or not additional market indices are included) become much more important over longer time horizons, creating additional sources of noise.
Looking at columns 1-3 of Table 12 , we see that results are still broadly similar for cumulative abnormal returns over the 20 trading days after the referendum. The main di¤erence to our baseline results is that the coe¢ cients on our proxies for exchange rate e¤ects (currency dummies, trade status indicators) are smaller and less signi…cant than before. On the other hand, the coe¢ cients on our proxies for recessionary expectations (recession-proof dummy, share of UK a¢ liates) have actually increased in size and signi…cance. Cumulative abnormal returns over the 60 trading days after the referendum (columns 4-6) show somewhat weaker patterns than before. The regression R 2 is now only around 15%, compared to approximately 30% for the 20-day horizon and 35% for our baseline regression. The proxies for exchange rate e¤ects are now insigni…cant although interestingly, coe¢ cient signs and magnitude are similar to before, suggesting that the lack of signi…cance is mainly driven by increased noise. The recession-proof dummy is now also slightly smaller in magnitude and insigni…cant throughout, possibly re ‡ecting the fact that by September 2016, it had become clear that initial fears of an immediate recession were unfounded. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient magnitudes and signi…cance levels of the UK a¢ liate share variable are still very similar to our baseline results, indicating that investors continued to take a negative view of …rms with high exposure to the domestic UK market almost three months after the referendum. Our results support the hypothesis that stock market participants expected an economic downturn or even a recession in the days after the referendum. Share price movements during this period were also a¤ected by the depreciation of sterling. By contrast, we …nd little evidence for the importance of variation in EU migrant shares across industries or future trade barriers in explaining abnormal returns following the referendum result. When analysing market reactions to Theresa May's two speeches our proxies have less explanatory power, consistent with the idea that much of the content of the speeches was already known to investors. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that abnormal return patterns were at least partially explained by expectations about future tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers on the days of the two speeches. This result is less robust, however, and depends on the length of the event window chosen.
While our analysis provides new insight into investors'expectations about the consequences of Brexit, real economic e¤ects will take time to materialise and market participants may be wrong. Fears that the Leave vote would trigger an immediate recession were unfounded, but the UK's economic growth has slowed relative to other major economies since 2016 (Born et al. 2017) . It is too soon to know how Brexit will a¤ect …rms that engage in cross-border trade or investment between the UK and the EU. Crucially, the impact will depend on the nature of UK-EU relations after Brexit, which, at the time of writing, remain undecided.
A Construction of Alternative Sales Share Measures
For our robustness check in Section 5.2 (Table 6) , we use two methods to calculate the geographic sales distribution of the …rms in our sample.
A.1 Method 1 -Using Sales of Subsidiaries of the Parent Firm
We start with the subsample of …rms from Orbis that had complete information about their own sales (operating revenue) and the sales of their subsidiaries. Sales of each parent …rm are the sum of the sales of all its subsidiaries including any sales of the parent …rm itself. Accounting rules around the world (especially IFRS) require the parent …rm to consolidate the …nancial statements of all its subsidiaries when the ownership of the parent …rm is 50% or greater in its subsidiaries. 29 Therefore, we only use data for subsidiaries in which the parent …rm has at least a 50% ownership stake.
In principle, the sum of sales of all subsidiaries should be equal to the consolidated sales of the parent …rm but this is not the case in Orbis. There are 126 …rms for which the sum of sales of the subsidiaries exceeds the consolidated sales of the parent …rm and we drop all such companies, leaving us with a …nal sample of 360 …rms.
For these …rms, we impute the sales of any subsidiary with missing sales data as follows. We subtract the sum of available sales of all subsidiaries from the consolidated sales of the parent …rm and then divide the result by the total number of subsidiaries with missing sales data. To illustrate, assume that the consolidated sales of the UK parent …rm are £ 100 million (excluding sales of the parent …rm itself), that it has three subsidiaries and that sales information is only available for one subsidiary located in Germany (sales of £ 50 million). The sales data for the other two subsidiaries located in the United Kingdom and Spain are missing. Out imputation procedure attributes the remaining £ 50 million equally across these two subsidiaries.
Finally, to compute the share of total sales of the parent …rm originating from Europe, we sum the sales of all subsidiaries located in Europe and divide it by the consolidated sales of the parent …rm (using 2016 data). Similarly, we compute the share of total sales originating in the UK.
A.2 Method 2 -Using the Geographic Breakdown of the Sales of Parent Firms
Orbis also directly reports the geographical breakdown of …rm sales. The level of aggregation used in the geographical breakdown is not homogenous, and information is sometimes for a region (not a country) or even multiple regions. We classify sales as originating from Europe if the geographic area of the sales of the parent …rm is given as Europe only (or any of the countries in Europe). We also classify sales as originating from Europe if the geographic area of the sales of the parent …rm is given as "Europe and Asia"(or "Europe and Africa"or "Germany and Ghana") instead of Europe alone. We adopt this approach because our aim is to calculate the dependence of the parent …rm (in terms of its sales) on Europe. Not classifying "Europe and Africa"as sales originating from "Europe"will underestimate the dependence of the parent …rm on Europe. Finally, we consolidate the sales originating from each of Europe and the UK, and divide by total sales of the parent …rm (using 2016 data) to calculate the sales shares. Missing data or unsuitable geographic breakdowns of sales made it impossible to calculate segment-based sales shares for the majority of …rms in our sample, leaving us with information for only 181 …rms. ) is the logarithm of the value of a firm's assets. ROA is a firm's return on assets. Non-GBP Reporting Currency is a dummy variable for whether a firm reports earnings in a currency other than sterling. EU MFN is the current EU most-favoured nation tariff applied to third countries for goods-producing industries, while STRI is the service trade restrictiveness index developed by the World Bank for services industries. "Recession-proof" is a dummy variable for industries that tend to outperform the market in recessions. Exporter, importer and exporter-importer are dummies for firms' trade status. Narrow and wide refer to the type of industry mapping methodology used. (1) and (4) is the abnormal returns on the first trading day following the referendum. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the abnormal returns after Theresa May's speech at the Conservative Party conference. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) is the abnormal returns after the Lancaster House speech. Columns (1)-(3) estimate the baseline equation for the overall sample using sales shares from Orbis rather than affiliate count to measure the importance of EU and UK affiliates. Columns (4)-(6) estimate the baseline equation using segment data from the annual accounts of parent companies, which report the geographic breakdown of overall sales. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (1)- (3) is the overall return on the first trading day following the referendum. The dependent variable in columns (4)- (6) is the overall return after Theresa May's speech at the Conservative Party conference. The dependent variable in columns (7)- (9) is the overall return after the Lancaster House speech. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimate the baseline equation for the overall sample.
Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6) , and (9) estimate the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (1)- (3) is the abnormal returns from 23 June to 1 July 2016. The dependent variable in columns (4)- (6) is the abnormal returns from 3 October to 7 October 2016. The dependent variable in columns (7)- (9) is the abnormal returns for 16 January to 20 January. Columns (1), (4) and (7) estimates the baseline equation for the overall sample. Columns (2), (5) and (8) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of the MFN tariff rate for good-producing industries. Columns (3), (6) , and (9) estimates the baseline equation including the measure of NTBs for selected services industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 4-digit NACE level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This appendix provides results from a number of additional robustness checks not reported in the paper: i) including investment trusts in our regression sample; ii) using a narrower de…nition of our trade barrier measures by using only data for a …rm's core industry rather than an average barrier across all industries a …rm is active in; iii) including dummy variables for broad NACE 1-digit industry groups (Agriculture and Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction, Finance and Insurance, and Other Services); iv) using a di¤erent market portfolio proxy for the computation of abnormal returns (the MSCI Europe instead of the FTSE All Shares); and v) using a shorter estimation period (six months instead of a one year).
The results in Table A .1 are based on a larger regression sample that also includes investment trusts. This increases our sample size by around 50% but leaves the results on 24 June 2016 broadly intact. In particular, the recession and sterling depreciation proxies retain their signs and signi…cance although the export status variable is now only statistically signi…cant at the 15% level. One exception is that the share of EU a¢ liates is now statistically signi…cant for the full sample in column 1. However, the coe¢ cient magnitude is very similar to Table 5 , suggesting that it is the increase in sample size that led to the gain in statistical signi…cance.
The results for the other two event dates are also broadly similar to before. Note that since investment trusts are not in the goods-producing sector, we do not observe MFN tari¤s for them, and the results in columns 2, 5 and 8 are basically identical to before. 1 By contrast, the STRI contains a measure of restrictiveness for …nancial services which is what we use for investment trusts. We acknowledge that the restrictiveness indicated by the STRI might not be relevant for investment trusts who are likely to be less a¤ected by issues such as passporting rights after Brexit. The coe¢ cient estimate on the STRI variable does indeed drop on 17 January 2017 compared to our baseline speci…cation, indicating that measurement error might be a problem. Table A. 2 reports results for our goods and service producing subsamples where we apply a narrower de…nition of our trade barrier measures by using only data for a …rm's core industry rather than an average barrier across all industries a …rm is active in. This further reduces sample size, especially for the regressions containing the STRI. Nevertheless, results for both trade barrier variables are very similar to before.
In Table A .3, we include dummy variables for broad NACE 1-digit industry groups (Agriculture and Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction, Finance and Insurance, and Other Services). Note that we cannot include …ner industry …xed e¤ects because some of our key variables only vary at the industry level. As seen, the results are broadly similar to the robustness check of including investment trusts. The recession and depreciation proxies retain their signs and signi…cance, with the export status variable again being less signi…cant and the EU a¢ liates variable more signi…cant. Tables A.4 and A.5, we further examine the robustness of our results to di¤erent speci…cations for the estimation of abnormal returns. In Table A . 4 we use a di¤erent market portfolio (the MSCI Europe instead of the FTSE All Shares) and in Table A .5 we use a di¤erent length for the estimation period (six months instead of a one year). Both modi…cations again leave the baseline results essentially unchanged. 
Finally, in
